Last week, the public was utterly disgusted with the unabashed disregard of the House of Congress to the doctrine of bicameralism enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The same was manifested when they misrepresented and maligned the true meaning of the provision effecting the change of the Constitution via constitutional assembly. Ironically, the injudicious act came about right after the Supreme Court, under the Chairmanship of former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, adjudicated the Lambino Case on People’s Initiative with finality against the petitioners. Nonetheless, the goal of the petitioners and that of the majority party in the Congress is the same, to bring about Constitutional Change.
This post is not all about the viability of such change but rather the legitimacy of the act of the Lower House in invoking that voting of the Congress in connection to the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly should be done jointly with Senate. But before anything else, let us analyze the implication of allowing joint voting vis-à-vis separate voting. In the former, the play of numbers has a very, very significant role. The fusion of the two chambers will disregard the power of the Senate to have a voice in the issue due to the obvious advantage of the Lower House insofar as membership is concerned. In my most humble opinion, the Lower House failed to contextually analyze the language of the law as well as the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. It seems that there is only one instance wherein the Congress is allowed to have joint voting and that is only in the case of martial law. The purpose of the limited power is in order to uphold Bicameralism. In Bicameralism, separation of powers is the thrust of the framers in requiring that public power be symmetrically divided between the House of Congress and Senate. This is a borrowed principle from the United States which was carried on in the 1935 and the 1987 Constitution. This is actually a response to concentration of powers. The intent of the framers is to effect participatory and direct democracy. Applying it to the two chambers, we see that every power vested to the Lower House has a counterpart in the Senate. For example, the House of Congress has the authority to initiate the General Appropriation’s Act because proximity wise, they are expected to know firsthand the needs of their constituents, Senate on the other hand, must assent with the proposal since it is a national institution which is expected to have a greater institutional competence to reflect the interest of the nation; House of Representatives is the only one vested with the power to file an impeachment complaint against the president, Senate for its part is responsible with the trial. This shows the fact that they are co-equal even though the House of Representatives is more numerous.
Moving on, it will then appear that the act of excluding Senate is a sui generis exemption to the Constitutional mandate of separate voting. The more pressing question now is what is needed to be done by the Supreme Court? I believe that they must issue a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Congress from proceeding with the Constitutional Assembly due to the fact that it is presumptuously illegal. The House of Congress might invoke that it is a political question; however, it is an issue that involves great public interest which, in effect, justifies court intervention
At the end of the day, we have to look back and learn from our past mistakes. Let us be reminded that the same thing happened during the Marcos regime when Senator Taňada’s request for injunction was denied not because it was not meritorious but because the Constitution was already signed by President Marcos rendering the said issue moot and academic which became prejudicial to the Filipino people. It is a technical detail that will surely place Chief Justice Puno into test. Jose De Venecia will possibly count on the new Chief Justice for a 7-7 voting outcome which is insufficient to declare the act as unconstitutional. But there is always hope. History should tell us that people have lied so many times in the past. Hence, we have to be vigilant in protecting our collective right to live in a safe place by upholding the rule of law.
This post is not all about the viability of such change but rather the legitimacy of the act of the Lower House in invoking that voting of the Congress in connection to the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly should be done jointly with Senate. But before anything else, let us analyze the implication of allowing joint voting vis-à-vis separate voting. In the former, the play of numbers has a very, very significant role. The fusion of the two chambers will disregard the power of the Senate to have a voice in the issue due to the obvious advantage of the Lower House insofar as membership is concerned. In my most humble opinion, the Lower House failed to contextually analyze the language of the law as well as the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. It seems that there is only one instance wherein the Congress is allowed to have joint voting and that is only in the case of martial law. The purpose of the limited power is in order to uphold Bicameralism. In Bicameralism, separation of powers is the thrust of the framers in requiring that public power be symmetrically divided between the House of Congress and Senate. This is a borrowed principle from the United States which was carried on in the 1935 and the 1987 Constitution. This is actually a response to concentration of powers. The intent of the framers is to effect participatory and direct democracy. Applying it to the two chambers, we see that every power vested to the Lower House has a counterpart in the Senate. For example, the House of Congress has the authority to initiate the General Appropriation’s Act because proximity wise, they are expected to know firsthand the needs of their constituents, Senate on the other hand, must assent with the proposal since it is a national institution which is expected to have a greater institutional competence to reflect the interest of the nation; House of Representatives is the only one vested with the power to file an impeachment complaint against the president, Senate for its part is responsible with the trial. This shows the fact that they are co-equal even though the House of Representatives is more numerous.
Moving on, it will then appear that the act of excluding Senate is a sui generis exemption to the Constitutional mandate of separate voting. The more pressing question now is what is needed to be done by the Supreme Court? I believe that they must issue a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Congress from proceeding with the Constitutional Assembly due to the fact that it is presumptuously illegal. The House of Congress might invoke that it is a political question; however, it is an issue that involves great public interest which, in effect, justifies court intervention
At the end of the day, we have to look back and learn from our past mistakes. Let us be reminded that the same thing happened during the Marcos regime when Senator Taňada’s request for injunction was denied not because it was not meritorious but because the Constitution was already signed by President Marcos rendering the said issue moot and academic which became prejudicial to the Filipino people. It is a technical detail that will surely place Chief Justice Puno into test. Jose De Venecia will possibly count on the new Chief Justice for a 7-7 voting outcome which is insufficient to declare the act as unconstitutional. But there is always hope. History should tell us that people have lied so many times in the past. Hence, we have to be vigilant in protecting our collective right to live in a safe place by upholding the rule of law.
